

Addressing Maritime Security Challenges In The Indian Ocean Through Enhanced Regionalism

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MAJOR POINTS

- Indian Ocean overview
- Piracy-Trafficking-Terrorism as Risks
- Pirate Attacks
- Trafficking
- Terrorist acts
- Needs of Capacity Building
- Regionalism and Major Powers

THE INDIAN OCEAN OVERVIEW



- Third largest body of water
- 47 countries with it at its shore
- Connecting Africa, the Mid-East
- 40% of offshore oil production
- Critical waterway for global trade and commerce
- 50% of world's containerised cargo, 1/3 of bulk cargo, 2/3 of oil shipment.
- 4 strategic choke points.
- Host of unending armed conflicts
- Discrepancy in power distributions.

Seams and
gaps in
jurisdictions
and effective
authority

Strategic
Value

Armed
conflicts


Opportunities for
VNSA's to commit
illicit actions:
Pirate attacks,
Terrorist attacks,
unregulated
trafficking/trafficking
of illegal good

PIRACY-TERRORISM-TRAFFICKING AS RISKS


- Piracy-Terrorism-Trafficking are uncertainties that can manifest in the future as a result of human actions in the present: what we do and what we fail to do in the present will decide the continuation of maritime insecurity in the Indian Ocean.
- Strategic values of the IO and its usage as heavy-trafficked waterways inevitably created problems.
- The three problems are 'threats without identity'.
- Their continuity in the future depends on the tolerance towards ungoverned spaces and readiness to mitigate or suppress them.

The Risk Of Piracy And Armed Robbery In The Indian Ocean


Pirate Attacks by Region and Attack Type (1996-2010)



Kidnapping For Ransom Near Somalia (2006-2010)




PIRATE ATTACKS 2008-2014



ECONOMIC COST OF MARITIME PIRACY IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN THROUGHOUT 2014

- - 2.3 billion USD, down 28% compared to 2013
- - 64% borne by industry
- - International navy coalition mandates remain unchanged, but fewer assets have been committed to the missions.
- - Re-routing and observed speeds continue to decline and insurance premiums have dropped steadily since the height of the piracy crisis.
- - Percentage of vessels employing armed guards remained stable, but teams are getting smaller and more diverse due to cost pressures.

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- Most of the economic costs are borne by industry-employed vessel protection measures, including armed guards, security equipment, increased speed, rerouting (1.2 billion USD, 56%)
 - Followed by the government in conducting military operations, ransom payments, prosecutions and imprisonments and counter-piracy organisations (805 million USD, 36%),
 - And finally there are other industry costs of 175 million USD for insurance and labor payments.

2014 NUMBERS

- Somali piracy continued to soar for another couple of years and reached its pick in 2010. Then the rate of success of attacks perpetrated by Somali pirates steeply declined, so that no successful boarding or hijackings attributable to them were registered in 2013 and 2014.
- Throughout 2014: 142 incidents. 13% (18 out of 142) have been classified as attacks, 2 of which resulted in successful hijacking of dhows.
- 320 seafarers were subjected to attacks, 18 hostages were released while 26 hostages remain in captivity.
- Released hostages in 2014 (11 hostages from *MV Albedo* held for 1,288 days & 7 hostages from *MV Asphalt Venture* held for 1,492 days).
- 26 hostages (all taken from *FV Naham 3* - hijacked 26 March 2012) remain at very high risk due to poor conditions of confinement ashore and slow negotiations.
- 87% percent of all reported activities in the Western Indian Ocean Region are categorised "suspicious activity" and were often classified as "false alarms" by reporting centers.

THE RISK OF ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

- Illicit trafficking of narcotics, SALW, people, as well as smuggling of oil, cigarettes, charcoal, khat, endangered species, within and via the Indian Ocean will persist because:
 - High-volume of supply
 - Export destinations
 - Means of sea transportation
 - Unpatrolled coastlines
- Afghani heroin bound for Europe via Iran-Pakistan-UAE, and via Arabian Sea - Red Sea - Suez Canal
- SALW tracks between Iran, Yemen, and Eastern Mediterranean via Suez Canal and between Arabian Peninsula and Horn of Africa.
- Human trafficking track between southern Red Sea and Horn of Africa to Southern Arabian Peninsula; between eastern Arabian Peninsula to Persian Gulf
- High-volume trafficking between Bosaso and Berbera in Somalia and Yemen. Trafficked persons in Yemen from Eritre, Sudan and Djibouti.

ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN THE INDIAN OCEAN



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MARITIME TERRORISM

- Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQ-AP) in February 2010 declared intention to close Bab al-Mandeb and bring it under the protection of Islam.
- There is no evidence that Al-Shabaab has a maritime attack capability or is actively planning maritime operations.
- Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB) has demonstrated the capability to attack shipping in the Persian Gulf.
- LeT used the maritime environment as a conduit for moving goods, people, supplies, and weapons across the Indian Ocean in conducting the 2008 Mumbai attack → highlighting operational seams between Coast Guard and Navy.

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 2184 (2014)

- Renewed call upon States and regional organizations that had the capacity to do so to fight ongoing sea crimes by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft and through seizures of boats, vessels and weapons used in the commission of those crimes.
- Exemption, from the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by resolution 733 (1992), supplies of weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of States, international, regional and subregional organizations taking measures in line with the authorizations.
- Security Council urged all states to adopt legislation to facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates and to take measures to prevent the illicit financing of piracy.

NAVAL PRESENCE

- Multinational task forces with specific counter-piracy mandates
 - the European Naval Force Operation Atalanta (CTF-465);
 - NATO's Operation Ocean Shield (CTF-508);
 - Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151)
- Single countries started to deploy naval vessels off the Horn of Africa, including, China, India, Iran, Korea, and Russia.
- Militarisation of the Indian Ocean?
- Piracy has not disappeared; it is simply contained. There are still a multitude of reports of suspicious approaches and attempted attacks foiled by naval forces or private security guards – although the reliability of the sources is sometimes questionable

Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP)

- No vessel protected by armed teams has ever been hijacked by Somali pirates.
- Many shipping companies started to embark private armed security guards, although it is the obligation of the flag state to provide security on board through the use of military “Vessel Protection Detachments” (VPD) on board merchant vessels flying the State flag.
- 2014 data: Armed guard costs are estimated to be between \$598,177,000 and \$683,631,000. Armed guard usage remained at 35% to 40% of vessels in the HRA.
- Judiciary controversies: while ships enjoy the right of innocent passage in international waters, carrying weapons or armed guards is not compatible with innocent passage.
- Incidents have occurred where small vessels, of the type used by both fishermen and pirates, have been found empty, or containing dead bodies

NAVAL MISSIONS VS CAPACITY BUILDING

- Naval Missions:
 - - deals with specific mission/task, e.g. counter-piracy
 - - depoliticised
 - - military actor
 - - very short term and ad hoc training as part of port visits focusing on the transfer of skills largely through demonstration.
- Capacity building:
 - - deals with inter-linkage of problems: piracy-terrorism-trafficking (broader security and development challenges)
 - - political in nature
 - - various actors: private security, port development companies, humanitarian agencies
 - - Involving delivery of some equipment, intensive training courses for selected specialists, setting up of training infrastructure, education.

BEYOND COUNTER ACTIONS: CAPACITY BUILDING NEEDS

- Naval operations/ joint exercises
- Intelligence sharing mechanism
- At-Port security counter-measures
- At-Sea interdiction
- Privately contracted armed security personnel

- National
- Regional
- Major powers

Timely And Accurate Intelligence-sharing

- Timely and accurate intelligence
 - → effective security screening and reliable officials at points of export, transshipment, and landing
 - → capacity for interception at sea.
- Intelligence sharing: the problem of capacity gap and distrust.
- Harness the surveillance and threat-reporting capability of all of the merchant vessels in HRA to expand the intelligence-gathering capacity for military forces. → hel track motherships

The Capacity For Patrol And Interception At Sea

- All available international and regional naval and coast guard assets dedicated to counter-piracy, little or no spare capacity for trafficking interdiction.
- More robust and sustained naval patrolling by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE to match the states' heavy reliance on shipping for their economy.
- Western powers could provide logistical replenishment support for the states' patrolling effort.
- India and Pakistan could likely provide sea and air surveillance resources to endure netter security nearer to their EEZs.
- Maritime Patrol Aircraft and UAV assets based in Seychelles, Kenya, Tanzania, Oman and Madagascar enhance current levels of maritime domain awareness (MDA).
- US, UK, China, France, Germany, Japan, and Turkey could provide additional frigates and destroyers to extend the patrolling footprint deeper into the HRA guided by improved MDA and intelligence.

At-port Measures In Preventing Illicit Trafficking

- Coalition forces and the UN must continue to strengthen cooperation with security forces and port authorities of Indian Ocean Rim states.
- Human trafficking reduction from the Gulf of Aden is best affected before they put to sea.
- Internationally-supported financial program to boost naval and coastguard capacity of Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles to enable them provide better maritime security of their own backyard.

REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS: WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED TO CARRY OUT CAPACITY BUILDING

- Coordination role - network model: Actors coordinate via nodal points in which they share information and align their behaviour in an ad hoc manner.
- Capacity building through multilateral schemes depends on the political decision/ responsibility of member states; once approved any policy has to be implemented.
- Coordination mechanism ideally provides a platform for actors to trust each other and work on shared objectives; trust is created through daily mutual engagement in common projects. Perhaps, initiated with a particular experienced patron.
- Provide coordination infrastructure/ mechanism to as much as possible by-pass bureaucratic politics.

CONT'D

- Building member-states' ownership as a prerequisite to their empowerment.
- Mismatch of the interests of the international community and the countries which are supposed to own the process. tackling piracy - terrorism-trafficking may not be shared by regional states that prioritise measures that have long term economic benefits, including the building of better infrastructures, such as port facilities, or roads, or maritime research and education.
- Regional states must avoid having extra-regional partners dictate the needs assessment since it will decrease ownership. To be able to identify needs, one requires knowledge (and often research) about what is actually needed.